Being Social Without Media

Chosen Prompt: Begin an experiment involving quitting social media and reflect upon your reasons for doing so

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Why do I rarely utilize social media? What benefits are there? To answer this, I’ll list three categories to warrant my cessation of using social media: God, others, and myself. First, reading literature related to my area of interest, namely, Christianity, takes time. When I pour my time into social media, it’s at the expense of another thing; naturally, one would ask: What is most important to you? My answer would be my faith in Jesus Christ, the Son of God. If I have time to use as I please, should it not be for the most important person in my life, God Himself? There is a colossal amount of literature concerning Christianity, so much that even several lifetimes wouldn’t be enough to cover it, much less have an exhaustive knowledge of it. I want my life to be used for the glory of God, and if I’m ignorant about what I believe and don’t study (see 2 Timothy 2:15), how can I expect that to happen? How can I expect to serve God and those around me? Apart from Christ, it is impossible. Still, I need to actively choose to follow Christ, which includes devoting my time to studying the Bible. 

Second, I would rather pour time into my relationships than spend time on social media. Responsibilities are a reality that most people face; not everything we do will be what we want to, but rather because we need to. The time commitment one has towards these duties will vary from person to person, but, more often than not, it consumes a significant portion of it. In light of this, I propose to myself another question: Would I rather spend my precious time and pour into my family or myself (it can be argued that social media is damaging to us; if anything is “poured into” myself, it could very well be poisonous)? Truly, to what extent would one go to be on social media? At the expense of fostering relationships with the most important people in their life? Saying it audibly sounds preposterous, yet, whether I realized it or not, that was what I was doing. The hours I spent on social media were taking away time that would’ve been better spent on my family. 

Thirdly, the reality of social media is that it draws you away from not only other people but the natural world as well. Moreover, it reduces you from a state of motion and activity to a state of stillness as your mind succumbs to the endless stream of content that is at your fingertips. We were certainly made to move; the sedentary lifestyle is a rejection of that. Our bodies cannot adapt to such a way of life that we are not built for. Bent knecks, rolled shoulders, slouched backs, the constant bending of the knees, little to no muscular exertion—the postural implications alone ought to alarm us! It took longer than I wished for me to realize the dangers of such a lifestyle. Since disconnecting myself from social media, I’ve spent more time outside, whether it’s running in the backyard with my nephew or taking a walk on a cool autumn morning. By living in ways that contribute to my health, I can more effectively achieve the two aforementioned reasons and bring longevity to my life; this adds to one of the most precious resources of all: time.

Social media is often more than a tool for people; it’s an addiction, an escape. I can recall a time when I sat on my bed and scrolled on TikTok for four hours. Afterward, I felt a wave of emptiness and regret, void of any motivation to do anything. There are only twenty-four hours in a day; what do I want to spend my time on earth doing? I don’t want to look back on my time on earth and realize that I spent so much of my life staring at a screen instead of investing my time in the things that matter. When I utilize social media, my intent is almost always to learn. Currently, I’m rarely on social media, and it’s improved various aspects of my life since making that change. However, I still spend time on YouTube (I don’t consider it identical to things such as Instagram or Snapchat). My reasons for doing so are to educate myself on Christianity. Yet, if I’m not cautious, it’s easy to fall into “doom scrolling” as I would with other forms of social media. It may not be a four-hour session as it was once on TikTok; however, the small sessions of doom scrolling accumulate over a day, week, month, and year. Reflect on your reasons for being on social media and contrast it with what you’re losing; the way we spend our time affects ourselves and those around us.

Thank You For Reading, 

John 3:16–21

David Fitzpatrick

Is the Correct Answer the Right One?

For this project, the following prompt will be addressed: “The standard definition of technology, Heidegger says is correct. But, it’s not true. Why not?” To demonstrate that Heidegger’s remark concerning the instrumentality of technology is sound, the author will discuss various things: First, defining the standard definition of technology; second, the shortcomings of such a definition; third, the proper understanding of instrumentality concerning technology; fourthly, the origins of the term “technology” and the connection between it’s traditional and modern conceptions; and lastly, I will examine how revealing occurs.  

Heidegger notes that “the merely correct is not yet the true” (Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, 6). This may seem to be a claim that goes beyond the bounds of rational thinking. However, I will offer an analogy to illustrate Heidegger’s point. Christians would say that Muslims are correct in their monotheism, that there is one true God. However, they would label their monotheism as false because their God (Allah) isn’t the true God. Here, we have an example of something being correct but not true. Getting back to the question, we must define the standard definition of technology before bringing it under scrutiny. Technology is commonly described in two respects: “[T]he instrumental and anthropological” (Heidegger, 5). In other words, technology is both “a means and a human activity” (Heidegger, 5). Before one begins to disregard the aforementioned definitions, heed Heidegger’s words concerning it: “Who would ever deny that it is correct? It is in obvious conformity with what we are envisioning when we talk about technology [. . .] [it] is indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of which, in other respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handwork technology, something completely different and therefore new” (Heidegger, 5). 

Rather, Heidegger retorts to skepticism concerning this definition by saying, “in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass” (Heidegger, 6). This is the difference; the ‘true’ is what allows us to uncover technology and peer into its essence. Yet, our instrumental and anthropological conception of what technology prevents us from reaching the point of uncovering. Why? It’s because “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological” (Heidegger, 4). Restricting our minds to the technological aspect of technology is precisely what creates this smokescreen in front of us as we attempt to gaze into the essence of it. 

Having defined the ‘correct’ definition of technology, it is now time to examine it and see why it is not ‘true’. Before proceeding, one might ask: What is the significance of instrumentality? Well, “[i]nstrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire, step by step, into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing” (Heidegger, 12). When attempting to learn what technology is, one cannot disregard its instrumentality; instead, we are to avoid reducing it as such. Again, “[t]echnology is therefore no mere [emphasis added] means” (Heidegger, 12). When we look beyond its instrumentality, “another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (Heidegger, 12). This “realm of revealing” cannot be entered into when utilizing technology as a “mere means” (Heidegger, 12). Although the instrumental definition is correct, it is not synonymous with the truth of technology’s essence. 

The term “technology” finds its origins in the Greek language; “Technikon means that which belongs to technē (Heidegger, 12). It does not refer “only [to] the activities and skills of craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs to bringing-forth, to poiēsis; it is something poietic” (Heidegger, 13). Heidegger demonstrates that even at the essence of the word, technology is not a “mere means.” Some rebut this by saying that “modern technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science” (Heidegger, 14). As such, the Greek rendering of the word does not fit in contemporary discourse on technology (see Heidegger, 13). Heidegger acknowledges that there is a difference between them, but he stands firm in asserting that modern technology, like traditional technology, ”is a revealing” (Heidegger, 14). He utilizes an illustration of “a tract of land [which] is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain” (Heidegger, 14–15). This is a notable difference compared to the “old windmill [. . .] [whose sails] are left entirely to the wind’s blowing” (Heidegger, 14). Although the two kinds of technology differ in their relationship to nature, both challenge it and bring forth that which is to be revealed; both forms of technology are indeed “a revealing” (Heidegger, 14). 

Heidegger notes that “[w]here and how does this revealing happen if it is no mere handiwork [emphasis added] of man? We need not look far” (Heidegger, 18). Stripping down the constructs that we have established and examining technology in an “unbiased” manner will be essential in revealing. Revealing does not stem from solely “human [acts]. Therefore we must take that challenging that sets upon man to order the real as standing-reserve in accordance with the way in which it shows itself. That challenging gathers man into ordering” (Heidegger, 19). The challenge claim that gets man to this point is called “[e]nframing” (Heidegger, 19). Heidegger defines it as “that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological” (Heidegger, 20). It is in the question of how one gets to the essence of technology, where it then becomes apparent that the mere instrumentality of technology cannot lead to it; as Heidegger noted, “the essence of modern technology [. . .] is [. . .] nothing technological” (Heidegger, 19). What is evident here? It’s that despite the correctness of technology’s instrumentality, it is a far cry from the essence of technology; in other words, the truth of technology cannot be understood apart from technology’s instrumentality but simultaneously cannot be identified as a mere means. Heidegger is challenging us to not view the ‘correct’ as synonymous with the ‘true.’ 

The mere fact that we are inquiring into technology’s essence itself “bear[s] witness to the crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with technology we do not yet experience the coming to presence of technology, that in our sheer aesthetic mindedness we no longer guard and preserve the coming to presence of art. Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art becomes” (Heidegger, 35). If the ‘correct’ definition of technology sufficed, there would be no need to inquire in the first place! Evidently, “the merely correct is not yet the true” (Heidegger, 6). 

Reference List

Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977)

The Path to Technology’s Essence

Prompt: On p. 12 in The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger provides an initial conclusion of this investigation: “Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing.” Explain how this revealing is different from mere instrumentality. Quote directly from Heidegger in your answer and illustrate with a contemporary example or examples.

To begin, I would like to finish the quote that is listed in the prompt. Martin Heidegger (1977) asserts that “[t]echnology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, p. 12). This is unlike the instrumental understanding of technology, which sees technology as a mere means. The instrumentality of technology does not show us the essence of it (Heidegger, p. 6). The revealing of technology can lead us to its essence, whereas the instrumentality cannot. A mere means cannot tell you what something is, but what it can do. I can read books, but does that reduce the book to something that is read? Yes, that may be its purpose or function, but is that all there is to it? To march beyond the instrumentality of technology, its truth must be revealed to us. 

By understanding this “revealing” of technology, we can also understand the bringing forth of technology as well. When we see technology as a “mere means” and ignore the bringing-forth, Heidegger responds by saying that we need the “bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis is indeed poiesis in the highest sense” (Heidegger, p. 10). This “[b]ringing-forth, indeed, gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning-causality-and rules them throughout. Within its domain belong end and means, belongs instrumentality.’ [. . .] The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing” (Heidegger, p. 12). Instrumentality is encapsulated within the bringing-forth, which is “grounded in revealing” (Heidegger, p. 12). By understanding the revealing of technology, which leads us to the essence of technology, “we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds” (Heidegger, p. 4).

The instrumental view of technology does not allow us to do this. It’s quite the opposite. Operating under the instrumental definition of technology leads us to confine technology within our boundaries; “man [. . .] exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct” (Heidegger, p. 27). Technology is not something to be conquered but something to experience. That is what the revealing of technology is leading us to; it is breaking down those boundaries that we have constructed concerning technology. Failing to do so leads to an encounter not with technology but only with ourselves (Heidegger, p. 27). 

Viewing technology as a mere means is a reduction to what it can do efficiently. There is no interest in what it is or our relation to it; it is defined by what it can do. Therefore, technology is reduced to and defined by the “ends that they serve” (Heidegger, p. 4). Viewing technology this way, encourages us in our “will [to] master it” (Heidegger, p. 5). This commonly held instrumental definition of technology is not wrong, but it’s not all there is. Technology is something beyond the end that it serves. For example, the wood on the tree is not merely pencils for college students. Again, when we direct our eyes to the key in our hand, we only see a means by which to lock something; we fail to see the key for what it is, our relationship to it, and its implications, which are acquired through revealing. The revealing of technology does not give us front-row seats to the essence of technology. Yet, it does allow us to see the truth that follows. It is this ‘true’ that “brings us into a free [emphasis added] relationship with that which concerns us from out of its essence” (Heidegger, p. 6). Defining technology as mere instrumentality does not allow this, but establishes the barriers that we have constructed.

Do Definitions Matter?

Prompt: What’s technology? Who cares/Why should anyone care how “technology” is defined?

Properly speaking, the word technology comes from the word “[t]echnikon[,] [which] means that which belongs to techne” (Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, 12). The term techne has been utilized “not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts” (Heidegger, 13). Concisely, we can conceive of technology in two respects: the instrumental and anthropological sense. Essentially, “[technology] is a means and a human activity” (Heidegger, 5). This is not to suggest that it’s as simple as this, but it’s not incorrect either.

Care or interest regarding the definition of technology should be extended to other terms. When we cease to care how words are defined, they become meaningless (devoid of meaning). Using this line of thought, to say “I love you” wouldn’t communicate anything substantial. It might be proper to call such speech “filler.” Or, to say, “She’s an exceptional basketball player” would cease to be a compliment if, at that point, we could even define what a compliment was. When we are talking about technology, we ought to understand what it entails and what it doesn’t. Failing to do so opens the gate to a presupposed idea of what technology is, not what it truly is. This will inhibit dialogue and sometimes prevent it. Val Dusek (2006) points out that “[m]any apparently substantive disagreements really stem from the disputants having two different definitions of what is being discussed” (What is Technology? Defining or Characterizing Technology, 26). Moreover, in Martin Heidegger’s (1977) work, The Question Concerning Technology, numerous footnotes give the reader the context and origin of what a term means. We too must recognize the importance of defining the words we use. If we don’t, it will be as if a person ate a meal without digesting the food. Simply presenting the information (or food) to someone willing to listen (or eat it) is not enough for them to comprehend (or digest) the information.

Is there a moral obligation to care how technology is defined? No, there isn’t. But, without a way to define the things around us, it would become excruciating to interact with the world and those around us. We need a foundation, and definitions like the one for technology provide that. Considering that technology is an important asset to humans and animals, why should we gloss over it? Why should we neglect to understand the meaning of a word that describes the things around us? Various things, such as phones, cars, pencils, and books, are products of and representative of technology. To dismiss technology and what it means is to disregard the importance of items that are crucial to us.