Prompt: Write an essay in which you argue for or against a distinction between therapeutic technological modification and technological enhancement. In your essay, also address the relationship between this distinction and the ethical acceptability of the modification.

I will be arguing that there is a distinction between therapeutic technological modification and technological enhancement. I am not arguing whether or not they are morally obligatory or entirely different in every way. Rather, I’m simply arguing that there is a necessary distinction between the two. Before moving forward, I will define the term “enhancement” that this essay will focus on. Enhancement “is to increase the worth or value of” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” n.d., 496). Yet, this begs the question: what is being enhanced? Is there something intrinsically valuable in humans? If so, what is it? For example, let’s say that a particular enhancement allows human beings to live twice as long as their normal counterparts would. Would this enhancement create a hierarchy within the moral worth of particular human beings over others?  

Despite our “inclusive” culture, it’s clear that we do value certain characteristics over others. Characteristics of desirable attributes that become (intentionally or unintentionally) a societal hierarchy. For example, Down syndrome is seen as an undesirable characteristic for a person to have. Denmark “became one of the first countries in the world to offer prenatal Down Syndrome screening to every pregnant women, regardless of age or other risk factors” (Sarah Zhang, “The Last Children of Down Syndrome,” The Atlantic, October 30, 2023, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/12/the-last-children-of-down-syndrome/616928/?gift=eIJLmzuJkH5uR7Iqhs9RLGZzK3mwG7Qsvmz3gn9i8Uo&utm_source=copy-link&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share, para. 2). Mothers who receive a Down syndrome diagnosis after the test almost always (more than 95% of the time) choose to abort their children, thus killing their child because of an undesirable characteristic (Sarah Zhang, “The Last Children of Down Syndrome,” The Atlantic, para. 2). My point in bringing this up is to illustrate the point that people already determine the worth of an individual based on their characteristics. In this case, Down syndrome was the determining factor as to whether or not the baby was worth keeping or not. It was not based on something intrinsic about a human being, but rather the quality of life they would experience. Parents even bestow their children with enhancements that are not biomedical, such as swimming lessons or math tutors (See “EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494).

Enhancements are not restricted to a philosophical discourse of what may or will be; after all, human beings already use enhancements. For example, the hearing aid that the professor uses provides an increase to his hearing capabilities. Something that is outside of himself is being applied to him to improve a natural biological function. To further exemplify this point, our bodies have the inherent ability to heal themselves, yet medicine is utilized to enhance this process. While the nature of the enhancements and their effect may differ, the point remains: we have become accustomed to using things that enhance our biological functions. Yet, the reader may notice that the two examples I provided either entail or presuppose a deficiency in our health. 

Enhancements may be valued, some more highly than others, such as one that would eliminate the genetic defect that causes Down syndrome. It is also an example of an enhancement that is also therapeutic. Yet, labeling it as “therapeutic” presupposes that Down syndrome is something that infringes on one’s quality of life and ought to be corrected. The article I referenced supports that this perspective is present among the citizens of Denmark and most likely other countries as well. Despite this overlap, does it entail that there is not a distinction between therapy and enhancement? Certainly, there is an overlap between therapeutic technological modification and technological enhancement, but to say the two are virtually identical is incorrect. 

Traditionally, enhancement and therapeutic technological modification have been contrasted with one another (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 493). The mere fact that they are being contrasted reveals that there is something different about each of them, despite any other similarities. Unlike utilizing technology to remedy deficient medical conditions (therapeutic technological modification), enhancement extends beyond the “terrain of medicine into the larger world of goals, values, and social institutions” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494). This point is evident in Julian Savulescu’s work, “New breeds of humans: the moral obligation to enhance,” which will be looked at shortly. 

Thomas H. Murray points out that there are several difficulties in assuming that “for biomedical intervention the key distinction is between enhancement and therapy” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494). First, the therapy itself “can be understood as enhancement” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494). Many physicians perceive their ministrations as simply “building upon the intrinsic [emphasis added] healing processes of the body and mind” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494). For example, antibiotics “can be understood as a means to enhance the body’s capacity to fight off infection” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494). Next, certain biomedical interventions are targeted at improving the individual’s health yet are an enhancement of sorts, such as vaccines. They work by “enhancing the immune system’s capacity to mount a response against an infectious agent” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 495). The goal of the vaccine is to enhance the number of antibodies when it sees a foreign substance within the body, thus building upon the latent capability of the immune system (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 495). While it is therapeutic in that it preserves our health and prevents diseases, it is also an enhancement that magnifies the body’s resistance “to infection” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 495). Lastly, Murray points out that some biomedical interventions, such as human growth hormone (hGH), “occupy a continuum between what appears to be a clearly ‘therapeutic’ application and an outright and unabashed pursuit of enhancement” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 495). Children who lack natural production of hGH may utilize this as a ‘therapeutic’ tool, whereas others may receive it simply because they will be a few inches below the average height (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 495).

While these provide challenges to my argument, they fail to refute it. Concerning his first point, the mere presence of overlap between the two categories does not demonstrate that the conceptual distinction between them is invalid. It does not follow that because antibiotics are a therapeutic means and a biological enhancement, therefore the two are the same and the distinction is invalid. While medicine may be utilized to enhance a pre-existing biological function, it does not necessarily entail a deficiency in that function (as seen with hGH). Therefore, the distinction between a therapeutic use of medicine and one geared towards biological enhancement is valid. Again, I acknowledge that there is overlap between therapy and enhancement, but it does not eliminate the distinctions. 

Second, vaccines do serve both purposes as an enhancement and a therapy. Murray makes a specific claim in that vaccines are a therapy in the same manner as they are an enhancement (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494). This portion of his argument is flawed from my perspective; I concede that his example demonstrates the vast overlap between the two, but vaccines are not given to remedy a pre-existing condition, such as Down syndrome. Rather, it is used to prevent one’s health from failing, akin to vitamins or exercise. While his example is valid, it does not account for the inherent differences between the aim of therapy and the aim of enhancement. 

Lastly, hGH can be used in a way that is geared towards restoring a deficiency in our health or as an enhancement. In fact, his example acknowledges as much. One child may be receiving hGH as a means of therapeutic technological modification, whereas another may use it as an enhancement towards their height. Moreover, multiple uses of a particular thing do not entail that those uses are not themselves distinct. For example, testosterone can be used therapeutically for men who have a natural deficiency in creating it, whereas others may utilize it as an enhancement. Despite its multiple uses, it does not entail that there is not a distinction between a therapeutic use of testosterone, and one aimed at enhancing one’s natural supply, that is not deficient. While hGH may occupy a unique continuum, it is not being served for both purposes at the same time. Therefore, the distinction between therapy and enhancement still stands. 

The distinction also provides a firmer framework for the moral ambiguity that enhancements can and will bring. If we eliminate the distinction between therapeutic use and biological enhancement, it follows that if we are morally obligated to provide therapy (whether biomedical or otherwise) to our children, it follows that the same applies to enhancements. Julian Savulescu, Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, argues that we do have a moral obligation to enhance human beings” (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10 Suppl 1 (2005): 36–39, Accessed December 12, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1472-6483(10)62202-X, 36). It is because of our evolutionary history that we select mates “both rationally and instinctively, on the basis of their genetic fitness – their ability to survive and reproduce. Our goal is the success of our offspring” (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 36). This is reflected in how women treat their unborn children and how parents treat their children outside of the womb. He points out that most people, despite what they say, implicitly reject the view that interfering with human nature is wrong. Things such as embryonic screenings, vaccines, pain relievers, and cancer treatments are examples of this (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 37). Although I disagree with him, if one forgoes the distinction between therapy and enhancement, the grounds to reject his argument become less firm. If we permit enhancements of one kind, why not support the enhancements that have the potential to be far more efficient, cost-effective, and less painful—emotionally and physically? To illustrate my point, Savulescu argues that “no one would object to the treatment of disability in a child if it were possible. Why, then, not treat the embryo with genetic therapy if that intervention is safe?” (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 37).

Using his example, let’s say the embryo was healthy but would be slightly shorter than average. Under Savulecu’s view, there is no reason to not give that child an enhancement, provided it is safe. To not do so would be “to harm them” (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 38). In my view, I can recognize that all of his previous examples are targeted at a deficiency in one’s health and thereby distinguish one’s moral obligation to provide such treatment, as opposed to people being morally obligated to enhance children who have no underlying health condition. Savulescu acknowledges that the basis for determining a genetic enhancement is unclear, thus advocating for a moral obligation towards enhancement yet no firm criteria as to what those enhancements (on matters unrelated to disabilities, disease, etc.) should be (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 38). As previously mentioned, enhancement steps into the world of “goals, values, and social institutions” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494). But this begs the question, what is valuable? Most would value things such as intellect, strength, speed, and so forth; in other words, those traits that contribute to human flourishing. But, because Savulescu argues that there is a moral obligation to provide enhancements, in the same way that we provide treatment for children with diseases, the issue becomes pressing.

However, Savulescu believes that the destruction of embryos is not infanticide (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 38). He believes that embryos are not people, as evidenced by the vast number of abortions and other matters concerning IVF and adoption (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 37). In sum, according to Savulescu, embryos are not children, but rather potential children (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 37). Yet, he goes on to argue that we are morally obligated to give enhancements to embryos in the same way that we give care to children (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 37). But if embryos do not carry the same moral value as human beings, why should we be obliged to give them enhancements? I’m not arguing that under Savulescu’s view embryos are worthless, but that they are worth less than human beings, in a similar way that concerning people, animals have less value but value, nonetheless. The distinction I’m arguing for does not entail a moral obligation to give humans and embryos (using Savulescu’s language) any enhancement that is deemed to increase the opportunities for our children and their experience of life. Savulescu provides no basis as to why one should be morally obligated to give a person and a non-person the same kind of care. A view that does not account for the distinction between therapy and enhancement will lead to a similar (if not identical) conclusion as Savulescu. 

Nevertheless, just because something is arbitrary does not mean that it cannot be defended (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 499). If one can “offer good reasons for drawing a line in the first place, and also good reasons for drawing it at this particular place, calling the line ‘arbitrary’ makes no important philosophical or ethical point” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 499). However, my critique is not that a line was drawn, but rather the moral obligation attached to it. There is a stark contrast between the morality of therapy and enhancement. The mere contemplation as to whether or not individuals should enhance themselves and/or their children demonstrates that “we are approaching unsettled moral territory” (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 494). On the other hand, most would not hesitate to “treat disease and promote health” in children (Savulescu, Julian, “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance,” 37). Some may say it’s obligatory, but the concept of enhancement is far more difficult to ascertain than therapeutic technological modifications. Murray notes that medical professionals may find enhancements useful as a boundary marker of what they are not morally obliged to do (“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” 493). Eliminating the distinction between therapy and enhancement gives credence to the obligations that Savulescu puts forth concerning enhancement. Hence, his argument is why I am advocating for a distinction between the two. 

Despite the overlap between therapeutic technological modification and enhancement, there are distinguishable differences between the two. By considering those differences, we can more effectively guide ourselves into a realm of upright moral actions concerning the progressive technology surrounding us. Instilling obligations to treat the infirmities of our children and promote their well-being is important, but enhancements extend beyond such things. Attaching a moral obligation to both will cloud our judgment and conflate two different treatments. In conclusion, the distinction between therapeutic technological modification and enhancement is not merely conceptually correct, but a lived experience. 

Bibliography

“EnhancementMurray.Pdf,” n.d. Accessed December 11, 2024. https://philtech2024.michaelreno.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/EnhancmentMurray.pdf.

Zhang, Sarah. “The Last Children of Down Syndrome.” The Atlantic, October 30, 2023. Accessed December 12, 2024. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/12/the-last-children-of-down-syndrome/616928/?gift=eIJLmzuJkH5uR7Iqhs9RLGZzK3mwG7Qsvmz3gn9i8Uo&utm_source=copy-link&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share. 

Savulescu, Julian. “New Breeds of Humans: The Moral Obligation to Enhance.” Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10 Suppl 1 (2005): 36–39. Accessed December 12, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1472-6483(10)62202-X.

Currently. I’m thinking of writing an essay that addresses the third prompt that Dr. Reno provided. However, part of me is contemplating incorporating the character AI, “Debate Champion,” into my project. For example, I’d write an essay that lays out my argumentation, have debate AI respond to it, and then proceed to do a rebuttal. I’d like to present my research through a video to everyone. Part of the reason I would like to do this is that students are constantly overloaded with reading material, having something audible would allow a change in the medium that students typically interact with. Moreover, when it comes to debate and argumentation, I find myself more engaged when I can hear and listen to the arguments, as opposed to simply reading them.

My goal in this project is to educate my audience and persuade them of my opinion. Outside of that, the rapid progression of technology has caused anxiety among many individuals, especially concerning biological enhancements. I hope to speak to those people and reassure them.

To achieve this goal, I’ll be utilizing the following sources:

• EnhancmentMurray.pdf
• Prenatal Testing and the Future of Down Syndrome – The Atlantic
• New breeds of humans: the moral obligation to enhance
• The Case Against Perfection – The Atlantic
• Catholic Conceptions of Personhood and Gene Editing | Contending Modernities
• We Already Enhance Ourselves | PHIL 251: David F.

Given that I do not have a position on the matter, nor am I well-read on this subject, the main obstacle will be a lack of familiarity with the material itself. If I can overcome these obstacles, I don’t anticipate that the project itself will be too overwhelming. 

Prompt: How can you tell something is AI-produced? Can you? Are there examples where you were fooled? What are the implications of your being fooled or not being fooled?

When I gaze upon an image that has been produced by AI, more often than not I can discern the origins of the image. I do not know how to articulate what elements of such images lead me to that conclusion; I recognize them when they are there. For lack of a better word, the pictures appear somewhat “artificial;” it’s as if the essence of an image is repackaged by AI as it generates countless images that all vary with one another. I also can’t discount my experience with AI, which has helped me analyze the qualities of an image that it produces.

There is also an element of perfection in images produced by AI. It’s not that natural images cannot be beautiful, symmetrical, crisp, and so forth, but the images that AI produces are consistently so. Human error pervades every aspect of our world; to take it away is to, in a sense, divorce humanity from images. I can’t recall when I was deceived into thinking that AI had not produced a picture when it did. However, Sora (a type of AI) will most likely deceive me at some point or another. I was introduced to it by a friend from church and awestruck by the realism therein. It is not perfect, but compared to the images that ChatGPT produces, it’s not remotely comparable. If virtual reality incorporates technology such as Sora, the line between reality and the virtual world will become more blurred. 

If I am not under the impression that an image is real, then I will regard it as “fake,” despite what my senses may tell me. When AI fails to fool me, it is a display of the limitations of AI to generate something that is “real,” which is discerned by our senses and intuition. However, if I do recognize the image is real, despite it not being so, a blend of fiction and reality is taking place in my mind. Our senses are the mechanisms by which we discern the real from the not-real. If AI progresses to a place where such discernment (via our senses) can no longer be consistently relied upon, we will not be able to determine whether something is real or not, apart from our intuition.

Prompt: For Blog post 5, synthesize your thinking about ethics and enhancement. This can take the form of a story, a small experiment, or just a normal short essay-like post.

A common theme when discussing biological enhancements to human beings is the morality of such a thing. Where do we draw the line? In our age of revolutionary technology, it’s hard to determine what even the next ten years will bring. Could little to nothing change? Sure, it is reasonable to assume that biological enhancements will not progress exponentially within the next ten years. On the other hand, everything could indeed change. When discussing this topic, we must recognize that the things we articulate as hypothetical may indeed become realities. As technology develops, so will enhancements. 

Taking a step back, it’s crucial to acknowledge that humans already use enhancements. For example, the glasses that the author is currently wearing aid in improving eyesight. Something that is outside of himself is being applied to him to improve a natural biological function. To further exemplify the point, our bodies have natural healing capabilities of their own, yet we take medicine to enhance that process. Furthermore, human skin can vasoconstrict to preserve heat in the body, yet we use clothes to preserve more heat. Whether we like it or not, enhancements are a part of our everyday lives. Certainly, there is a difference in degree, and the nature of the enhancement must be taken into account, but the point remains. 

 Should we utilize enhancements on human beings? As is commonly noted, to hold the negative position and support things such as dentists, surgeons, and pharmacists would be inconsistent. If we permit enhancements of one kind, why not support the enhancements that have the potential to be far more efficient, cost-effective, and less painful—emotionally and physically? Before I continue, I must define what I mean by an enhancement. An enhancement is an improvement or restoration of a pre-existing biological function that the human body has the natural capacity for. In other words, I am not proposing that we develop enhancements that would fundamentally alter the human being at its core. Rather, the suggestion is that we use enhancements to give human beings an optimal state of body and mind within the boundaries of their natural capabilities.

 Such a claim does not entail uniformity among the human race, nor does it mean that some individuals will not be better than others at a particular thing. Through enhancements, we can ensure that the individual’s natural capabilities are not hindered. For example, take two male children who are in the womb of their mother; the first will be born blind, and the second will be a few inches shorter than average. Unsurprisingly, an enhancement should be given to the first, as eyesight is a natural function of the human body that is not being realized by this individual. However, the second should not be given an enhancement because there is no evidence that being slightly shorter than average is hindering the natural capabilities of an individual. Even if one’s height falls within their natural capabilities, it is not something like blindness that can be stripped away. Each person has a degree of height; if there is no evidence of a condition that would affect the natural height of that individual, no intervention should be taken. In sum, conditions, diseases, or genetics that would limit the capabilities of a normal human should be eliminated via enhancements. Anything that falls outside of these boundaries should not warrant an enhancement. 

Prompt: Another aspect of our being enmeshed in technological devices and interfaces involves are attention and ability to focus it. Reflect on your ability to focus in relation to social media and the like.

Social media has revolutionized the way we give our time and attention to those around us. For most of mankind’s history, interactions were primarily engaged in person or by letter. What distinguishes these two means of communication from modern technology, such as social media, is the attention each person is given. When exchanging information and ideas with someone, there is an underlying assumption that attention needs to be given to one another for the conversation to have any meaning and progress in any manner. If I am dialoguing with my classmate and “tune out” for even a few seconds, it will make it difficult, if not impossible, for me to comprehend and engage with the information and thereby contribute to the conversation. As such, we have—through in-person communication—consistently trained ourselves to focus on the individual and/or object in front of us. Similar things can be said when it comes to written communication, such as a letter. Unlike a text, picture, blog post, and the like, a letter, once sent, cannot be edited or altered in any fashion. There is a “permanence” to the letter; it says what it says whether you like the content therein or not. Moreover, like a conversation, if there is to be any meaningful communication, focus on the letter itself must be given. If one attempts to skim through the letter, it is almost guaranteed that valuable information will be missed and/or not understood properly. 

A commonality between a conversation and a letter is a healthy pace. This pace is not always realized, but there is a natural pace and degree to which one engages in the conversation as ideas and information are exchanged. Social media utterly disrupts this with an ever-changing environment, fast-paced conversations, overwhelming amounts of choices, and at times, ridiculous amounts of information. Digital platforms, such as social media, “constantly tweak their interfaces and rules to attract and retain as many users as possible.”¹ Unlike an in-person conversation or a letter, social media is something that we can access as we please; we are “the master.” Reels have made this very apparent: if a piece of content doesn’t capture one’s attention within the first few seconds, they dismiss the person and anything they have to say. This may seem irrelevant but given the excessive amount of time that people spend on social media,² it becomes apparent that our ability to focus on a single person or task is diminished. There is an untold number of accounts, posts, videos, communities, and threads that people have the option to access or choose from. It is virtually impossible to have a singular focus on such a platform when several other options are demanding your attention. Notifications illustrate this “demand” perfectly, but more will be said on that later.

When it comes to conversing with others on social media, we are bestowed with a power that is not present in the other two modes of communication: “swiping” and “blocking.” Built within social media platforms (such as TikTok) is the swiping (also referred to as “doom scrolling”) mechanism. Effectively, you are the arbiter as to what kind of content you watch, from whom, the amount you watch, and when it’s time to stop. By one swipe of our finger, we quickly dismiss a person and what they have to say; this leads us to view people as less than human. In other words, people become pieces of content to consume or reject as they desire. If one is severely dissatisfied, they can block someone. Effectively, you erase that person from your life and prevent them from communicating with you; the other party cannot override this decision. Social media puts us at the center of a conversation; we can be surrounded by people who echo what we want to hear, and those who do not conform will be “excommunicated.” 

It is precisely because of the self-centeredness of social media that we are seeking gratification from it. Because of this desire, we want to focus on the object (namely, social media) that will give us pleasure. Yet, in this desire for consistent gratification, we are overloaded with the endless amount of stimulation that social media offers. Now, it must be noted that social media does have a great deal of benefits, education being one of them. However, this does not mean that there is not an improper use of it. Based on my own experience, we all ought to spend less time on social media; this will improve our physical and mental health. 

The author does not consistently use social media, but this was not always the case; a four-hour TikTok session comes to mind, as do many other hours that were wasted staring at a screen. When spending excess time on social media, I noticed that during actual conversations (conversations on social media do not count) my eyes would dart from one thing to another, as if I could not keep my eyes on the person (or “target”) in front of me. Moreover, I had less stamina for extended conversations that required depth in my replies and intentional listening. Social media provides an unorthodox and unnatural approach to communication as a whole, a far cry from the traditional and (I’d argue) proper way of conversing with one another. The amount of attention that our generation can give to a singular task at a given time is concerning, considering social media use isn’t decreasing. As previously mentioned, social media is not limited to the active usage of the app itself. Notifications open up access to the user in their everyday lives. Some people are eagerly waiting for the next notification to appear to justify their repeated use of social media. This anticipation draws focus away from the real world and the people in front of them. 

The repeated use of social media on a cellular device also engrains the habit of being on one’s phone. Such mindless scrolling lacks any focus, goal, or end in sight; in other words, it’s meaningless. And, if it’s meaningless, why pay attention to it? Yet, this is not the conclusion we come to when we are talking with others or engaging with material they have written. We understand that we are not at the center and that there are things and people beyond us. We must give them our time and attention to understand and interact with them. 

In asking ChatGPT, “Is our attention span positively impacted by using social media?” It responded by acknowledging that there are benefits concerning our attention but conceded that social media “tends to hinder deep, sustained attention needed for tasks requiring longer focus.”³ Moreover, it also concedes that while individual experiences may vary, “[t]he idea that social media objectively hinders focus and attention span is supported by much research.”⁴ This statement by ChatGPT led me to seek a scholarly article in support of that claim. One peer-reviewed study notes that “attention dysregulation predicts [problematic social media use], mediated by impulsive social media use.”⁵ As is the habit of many, we impulsively access social media without any particular reason for doing so. These sessions may be brief or extended, but they accumulate over time. By habitually disregarding our focus on a given activity, our ability to actively focus will be “unfit.” 

Following this, I asked ChatGPT to generate an image that captures the effect social media has on our ability to focus; I have attached the picture⁶ to this project below. The picture itself is overwhelming to even look at, which goes to show the damage we are doing to ourselves by actively engaging on social media. The solution is simple: use social media less. Personally, it has positively impacted my life to distance myself from the various platforms that compete for my attention. The “self” is obscured and sometimes forgotten when using social media because we play our identity in what people see, not in who we are. Breaking these shackles allows us to be human and recognize our shortcomings. 

This project has aimed to illuminate a simple yet consistent issue that’s been grafted into our lives. Hopefully, this project and my experience will resonate with the reader and set them on a path of freedom, where one’s identity is not found within a profile picture or the number of views one’s TikTok gets. 

1. William Davies, “William Davies, the Politics of Recognition in the Age of Social Media, NLR 128, March–April 2021,” New Left Review, April 30, 2021, https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii128/articles/william-davies-the-politics-of-recognition-in-the-age-of-social-media. 
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2. See David Caelum Arness and Theodora Ollis, “A Mixed-Methods Study of Problematic Social Media Use, Attention Dysregulation, and Social Media Use Motives” (Fredericksburg, August 8, 2022), 1 
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3. “Chatgpt,” ChatGPT, accessed October 16, 2024, https://chatgpt.com/share/671057ed-de50-800b-853b-22af14d7820a. 
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4. “Chatgpt,” ChatGPT 
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5. David Caelum Arness and Theodora Ollis, “A Mixed-Methods Study of Problematic Social Media Use, Attention Dysregulation, and Social Media Use Motives,” 9
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6. “Chatgpt,” ChatGPT ↩︎

Bibliography

Arness, David Caelum, and Theodora Ollis. “A Mixed-Methods Study of Problematic Social Media Use, Attention Dysregulation, and Social Media Use Motives.” Fredericksburg, August 8, 2022. 

“Chatgpt.” ChatGPT. Accessed October 16, 2024. https://chatgpt.com/share/671057ed-de50-800b-853b-22af14d7820a. 

Davies, William. “William Davies, the Politics of Recognition in the Age of Social Media, NLR 128, March–April 2021.” New Left Review, April 30, 2021. https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii128/articles/william-davies-the-politics-of-recognition-in-the-age-of-social-media. 

Prompt: Over the last 3 weeks, our discussion has moved from identity in relation to AI, big data, and social media to thinking about technological change and our identities in our jobs. What does technology have to do with our identities in relation to our jobs? Or, does technology simply make any job choice we make more precarious?

If people define themselves by what they do, then technology can be seen as stripping them of their identity. Saying “I am a lawyer” as the fundamental identifying marker is a grave error. When one’s occupation is stripped away, the question they are left with is, “What am I? I was a lawyer, but now I’m not. What’s left of me? I built my entire life around being a lawyer, and that’s been taken away from me.” Technology can make almost any job precarious. The question is whether we, as a society, will come to that point. Concerning technology, what limits will be established for jobs that humans have traditionally held? 

In reflecting upon the ever-increasing technological efficiency, John Keynes (1930) envisions that “[w]e may be on the eve of improvements in the efficiency of food production as great as those which have already taken place in mining, manufacture, and transport. In quite a few years—in our own lifetimes I mean—we may be able to perform all the operations of agriculture, mining, and manufacture with a quarter of the human effort to which we have been accustomed” (Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, 364). He then follows this thought by introducing the concept of “technological unemployment” (Keynes, 364). Essentially, unemployment will increase as technology is refined and eventually outpaces the rate at which “we can find new uses for labor” (Keynes, 364). Technology will only continue to get more efficient, and it seems inevitable that if we’ve continued to prioritize technological efficiency up to this point, why would we stop now? If technology can serve four times as many customers as a human can, why not implement an AI (or some other technology) that can fulfill that “need”? Our world is fast-paced, and we are consistently on “the go.” As such, all eyes gaze upon how a certain task can be accomplished more effectively and efficiently. Technology that eliminates human errors and operates at a fast pace will undoubtedly be the first pick when possible. 

The only withdrawal in this area is in areas of moral concern. For example, I do not envision an AI taking on the official role of a judge or a surgeon. Some situations cannot be reduced to a mere formula that AI can flawlessly respond to. Understandably, AI seems to be becoming more refined (as we’ve seen with the therapy AI), so there’s no telling what lengths people may be willing to go with AI. Currently, one does not need to worry about AI taking their job in the immediate future. However, there’s no telling as to how long this “security” will last. When deciding on a career, it’s important to keep in mind the possibility of AI fulfilling that role.

Sources

John Keynes, Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, 1930. Accessed October 6, 2024. https://philtech2024.michaelreno.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/KeynesWhatExpectGrandChildren.pdf

Chosen Prompt: Begin an experiment involving quitting social media and reflect upon your reasons for doing so

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Why do I rarely utilize social media? What benefits are there? To answer this, I’ll list three categories to warrant my cessation of using social media: God, others, and myself. First, reading literature related to my area of interest, namely, Christianity, takes time. When I pour my time into social media, it’s at the expense of another thing; naturally, one would ask: What is most important to you? My answer would be my faith in Jesus Christ, the Son of God. If I have time to use as I please, should it not be for the most important person in my life, God Himself? There is a colossal amount of literature concerning Christianity, so much that even several lifetimes wouldn’t be enough to cover it, much less have an exhaustive knowledge of it. I want my life to be used for the glory of God, and if I’m ignorant about what I believe and don’t study (see 2 Timothy 2:15), how can I expect that to happen? How can I expect to serve God and those around me? Apart from Christ, it is impossible. Still, I need to actively choose to follow Christ, which includes devoting my time to studying the Bible. 

Second, I would rather pour time into my relationships than spend time on social media. Responsibilities are a reality that most people face; not everything we do will be what we want to, but rather because we need to. The time commitment one has towards these duties will vary from person to person, but, more often than not, it consumes a significant portion of it. In light of this, I propose to myself another question: Would I rather spend my precious time and pour into my family or myself (it can be argued that social media is damaging to us; if anything is “poured into” myself, it could very well be poisonous)? Truly, to what extent would one go to be on social media? At the expense of fostering relationships with the most important people in their life? Saying it audibly sounds preposterous, yet, whether I realized it or not, that was what I was doing. The hours I spent on social media were taking away time that would’ve been better spent on my family. 

Thirdly, the reality of social media is that it draws you away from not only other people but the natural world as well. Moreover, it reduces you from a state of motion and activity to a state of stillness as your mind succumbs to the endless stream of content that is at your fingertips. We were certainly made to move; the sedentary lifestyle is a rejection of that. Our bodies cannot adapt to such a way of life that we are not built for. Bent knecks, rolled shoulders, slouched backs, the constant bending of the knees, little to no muscular exertion—the postural implications alone ought to alarm us! It took longer than I wished for me to realize the dangers of such a lifestyle. Since disconnecting myself from social media, I’ve spent more time outside, whether it’s running in the backyard with my nephew or taking a walk on a cool autumn morning. By living in ways that contribute to my health, I can more effectively achieve the two aforementioned reasons and bring longevity to my life; this adds to one of the most precious resources of all: time.

Social media is often more than a tool for people; it’s an addiction, an escape. I can recall a time when I sat on my bed and scrolled on TikTok for four hours. Afterward, I felt a wave of emptiness and regret, void of any motivation to do anything. There are only twenty-four hours in a day; what do I want to spend my time on earth doing? I don’t want to look back on my time on earth and realize that I spent so much of my life staring at a screen instead of investing my time in the things that matter. When I utilize social media, my intent is almost always to learn. Currently, I’m rarely on social media, and it’s improved various aspects of my life since making that change. However, I still spend time on YouTube (I don’t consider it identical to things such as Instagram or Snapchat). My reasons for doing so are to educate myself on Christianity. Yet, if I’m not cautious, it’s easy to fall into “doom scrolling” as I would with other forms of social media. It may not be a four-hour session as it was once on TikTok; however, the small sessions of doom scrolling accumulate over a day, week, month, and year. Reflect on your reasons for being on social media and contrast it with what you’re losing; the way we spend our time affects ourselves and those around us.

Thank You For Reading, 

John 3:16–21

David Fitzpatrick

For this project, the following prompt will be addressed: “The standard definition of technology, Heidegger says is correct. But, it’s not true. Why not?” To demonstrate that Heidegger’s remark concerning the instrumentality of technology is sound, the author will discuss various things: First, defining the standard definition of technology; second, the shortcomings of such a definition; third, the proper understanding of instrumentality concerning technology; fourthly, the origins of the term “technology” and the connection between it’s traditional and modern conceptions; and lastly, I will examine how revealing occurs.  

Heidegger notes that “the merely correct is not yet the true” (Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, 6). This may seem to be a claim that goes beyond the bounds of rational thinking. However, I will offer an analogy to illustrate Heidegger’s point. Christians would say that Muslims are correct in their monotheism, that there is one true God. However, they would label their monotheism as false because their God (Allah) isn’t the true God. Here, we have an example of something being correct but not true. Getting back to the question, we must define the standard definition of technology before bringing it under scrutiny. Technology is commonly described in two respects: “[T]he instrumental and anthropological” (Heidegger, 5). In other words, technology is both “a means and a human activity” (Heidegger, 5). Before one begins to disregard the aforementioned definitions, heed Heidegger’s words concerning it: “Who would ever deny that it is correct? It is in obvious conformity with what we are envisioning when we talk about technology [. . .] [it] is indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of which, in other respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handwork technology, something completely different and therefore new” (Heidegger, 5). 

Rather, Heidegger retorts to skepticism concerning this definition by saying, “in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass” (Heidegger, 6). This is the difference; the ‘true’ is what allows us to uncover technology and peer into its essence. Yet, our instrumental and anthropological conception of what technology prevents us from reaching the point of uncovering. Why? It’s because “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological” (Heidegger, 4). Restricting our minds to the technological aspect of technology is precisely what creates this smokescreen in front of us as we attempt to gaze into the essence of it. 

Having defined the ‘correct’ definition of technology, it is now time to examine it and see why it is not ‘true’. Before proceeding, one might ask: What is the significance of instrumentality? Well, “[i]nstrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire, step by step, into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing” (Heidegger, 12). When attempting to learn what technology is, one cannot disregard its instrumentality; instead, we are to avoid reducing it as such. Again, “[t]echnology is therefore no mere [emphasis added] means” (Heidegger, 12). When we look beyond its instrumentality, “another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (Heidegger, 12). This “realm of revealing” cannot be entered into when utilizing technology as a “mere means” (Heidegger, 12). Although the instrumental definition is correct, it is not synonymous with the truth of technology’s essence. 

The term “technology” finds its origins in the Greek language; “Technikon means that which belongs to technē (Heidegger, 12). It does not refer “only [to] the activities and skills of craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs to bringing-forth, to poiēsis; it is something poietic” (Heidegger, 13). Heidegger demonstrates that even at the essence of the word, technology is not a “mere means.” Some rebut this by saying that “modern technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science” (Heidegger, 14). As such, the Greek rendering of the word does not fit in contemporary discourse on technology (see Heidegger, 13). Heidegger acknowledges that there is a difference between them, but he stands firm in asserting that modern technology, like traditional technology, ”is a revealing” (Heidegger, 14). He utilizes an illustration of “a tract of land [which] is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain” (Heidegger, 14–15). This is a notable difference compared to the “old windmill [. . .] [whose sails] are left entirely to the wind’s blowing” (Heidegger, 14). Although the two kinds of technology differ in their relationship to nature, both challenge it and bring forth that which is to be revealed; both forms of technology are indeed “a revealing” (Heidegger, 14). 

Heidegger notes that “[w]here and how does this revealing happen if it is no mere handiwork [emphasis added] of man? We need not look far” (Heidegger, 18). Stripping down the constructs that we have established and examining technology in an “unbiased” manner will be essential in revealing. Revealing does not stem from solely “human [acts]. Therefore we must take that challenging that sets upon man to order the real as standing-reserve in accordance with the way in which it shows itself. That challenging gathers man into ordering” (Heidegger, 19). The challenge claim that gets man to this point is called “[e]nframing” (Heidegger, 19). Heidegger defines it as “that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological” (Heidegger, 20). It is in the question of how one gets to the essence of technology, where it then becomes apparent that the mere instrumentality of technology cannot lead to it; as Heidegger noted, “the essence of modern technology [. . .] is [. . .] nothing technological” (Heidegger, 19). What is evident here? It’s that despite the correctness of technology’s instrumentality, it is a far cry from the essence of technology; in other words, the truth of technology cannot be understood apart from technology’s instrumentality but simultaneously cannot be identified as a mere means. Heidegger is challenging us to not view the ‘correct’ as synonymous with the ‘true.’ 

The mere fact that we are inquiring into technology’s essence itself “bear[s] witness to the crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with technology we do not yet experience the coming to presence of technology, that in our sheer aesthetic mindedness we no longer guard and preserve the coming to presence of art. Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art becomes” (Heidegger, 35). If the ‘correct’ definition of technology sufficed, there would be no need to inquire in the first place! Evidently, “the merely correct is not yet the true” (Heidegger, 6). 

Reference List

Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977)

Prompt: On p. 12 in The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger provides an initial conclusion of this investigation: “Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing.” Explain how this revealing is different from mere instrumentality. Quote directly from Heidegger in your answer and illustrate with a contemporary example or examples.

To begin, I would like to finish the quote that is listed in the prompt. Martin Heidegger (1977) asserts that “[t]echnology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, p. 12). This is unlike the instrumental understanding of technology, which sees technology as a mere means. The instrumentality of technology does not show us the essence of it (Heidegger, p. 6). The revealing of technology can lead us to its essence, whereas the instrumentality cannot. A mere means cannot tell you what something is, but what it can do. I can read books, but does that reduce the book to something that is read? Yes, that may be its purpose or function, but is that all there is to it? To march beyond the instrumentality of technology, its truth must be revealed to us. 

By understanding this “revealing” of technology, we can also understand the bringing forth of technology as well. When we see technology as a “mere means” and ignore the bringing-forth, Heidegger responds by saying that we need the “bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis is indeed poiesis in the highest sense” (Heidegger, p. 10). This “[b]ringing-forth, indeed, gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning-causality-and rules them throughout. Within its domain belong end and means, belongs instrumentality.’ [. . .] The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing” (Heidegger, p. 12). Instrumentality is encapsulated within the bringing-forth, which is “grounded in revealing” (Heidegger, p. 12). By understanding the revealing of technology, which leads us to the essence of technology, “we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds” (Heidegger, p. 4).

The instrumental view of technology does not allow us to do this. It’s quite the opposite. Operating under the instrumental definition of technology leads us to confine technology within our boundaries; “man [. . .] exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct” (Heidegger, p. 27). Technology is not something to be conquered but something to experience. That is what the revealing of technology is leading us to; it is breaking down those boundaries that we have constructed concerning technology. Failing to do so leads to an encounter not with technology but only with ourselves (Heidegger, p. 27). 

Viewing technology as a mere means is a reduction to what it can do efficiently. There is no interest in what it is or our relation to it; it is defined by what it can do. Therefore, technology is reduced to and defined by the “ends that they serve” (Heidegger, p. 4). Viewing technology this way, encourages us in our “will [to] master it” (Heidegger, p. 5). This commonly held instrumental definition of technology is not wrong, but it’s not all there is. Technology is something beyond the end that it serves. For example, the wood on the tree is not merely pencils for college students. Again, when we direct our eyes to the key in our hand, we only see a means by which to lock something; we fail to see the key for what it is, our relationship to it, and its implications, which are acquired through revealing. The revealing of technology does not give us front-row seats to the essence of technology. Yet, it does allow us to see the truth that follows. It is this ‘true’ that “brings us into a free [emphasis added] relationship with that which concerns us from out of its essence” (Heidegger, p. 6). Defining technology as mere instrumentality does not allow this, but establishes the barriers that we have constructed.

Prompt: What’s technology? Who cares/Why should anyone care how “technology” is defined?

Properly speaking, the word technology comes from the word “[t]echnikon[,] [which] means that which belongs to techne” (Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, 12). The term techne has been utilized “not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts” (Heidegger, 13). Concisely, we can conceive of technology in two respects: the instrumental and anthropological sense. Essentially, “[technology] is a means and a human activity” (Heidegger, 5). This is not to suggest that it’s as simple as this, but it’s not incorrect either.

Care or interest regarding the definition of technology should be extended to other terms. When we cease to care how words are defined, they become meaningless (devoid of meaning). Using this line of thought, to say “I love you” wouldn’t communicate anything substantial. It might be proper to call such speech “filler.” Or, to say, “She’s an exceptional basketball player” would cease to be a compliment if, at that point, we could even define what a compliment was. When we are talking about technology, we ought to understand what it entails and what it doesn’t. Failing to do so opens the gate to a presupposed idea of what technology is, not what it truly is. This will inhibit dialogue and sometimes prevent it. Val Dusek (2006) points out that “[m]any apparently substantive disagreements really stem from the disputants having two different definitions of what is being discussed” (What is Technology? Defining or Characterizing Technology, 26). Moreover, in Martin Heidegger’s (1977) work, The Question Concerning Technology, numerous footnotes give the reader the context and origin of what a term means. We too must recognize the importance of defining the words we use. If we don’t, it will be as if a person ate a meal without digesting the food. Simply presenting the information (or food) to someone willing to listen (or eat it) is not enough for them to comprehend (or digest) the information.

Is there a moral obligation to care how technology is defined? No, there isn’t. But, without a way to define the things around us, it would become excruciating to interact with the world and those around us. We need a foundation, and definitions like the one for technology provide that. Considering that technology is an important asset to humans and animals, why should we gloss over it? Why should we neglect to understand the meaning of a word that describes the things around us? Various things, such as phones, cars, pencils, and books, are products of and representative of technology. To dismiss technology and what it means is to disregard the importance of items that are crucial to us.