For this project, the following prompt will be addressed: “The standard definition of technology, Heidegger says is correct. But, it’s not true. Why not?” To demonstrate that Heidegger’s remark concerning the instrumentality of technology is sound, the author will discuss various things: First, defining the standard definition of technology; second, the shortcomings of such a definition; third, the proper understanding of instrumentality concerning technology; fourthly, the origins of the term “technology” and the connection between it’s traditional and modern conceptions; and lastly, I will examine how revealing occurs.
Heidegger notes that “the merely correct is not yet the true” (Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, 6). This may seem to be a claim that goes beyond the bounds of rational thinking. However, I will offer an analogy to illustrate Heidegger’s point. Christians would say that Muslims are correct in their monotheism, that there is one true God. However, they would label their monotheism as false because their God (Allah) isn’t the true God. Here, we have an example of something being correct but not true. Getting back to the question, we must define the standard definition of technology before bringing it under scrutiny. Technology is commonly described in two respects: “[T]he instrumental and anthropological” (Heidegger, 5). In other words, technology is both “a means and a human activity” (Heidegger, 5). Before one begins to disregard the aforementioned definitions, heed Heidegger’s words concerning it: “Who would ever deny that it is correct? It is in obvious conformity with what we are envisioning when we talk about technology [. . .] [it] is indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of which, in other respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handwork technology, something completely different and therefore new” (Heidegger, 5).
Rather, Heidegger retorts to skepticism concerning this definition by saying, “in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass” (Heidegger, 6). This is the difference; the ‘true’ is what allows us to uncover technology and peer into its essence. Yet, our instrumental and anthropological conception of what technology prevents us from reaching the point of uncovering. Why? It’s because “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological” (Heidegger, 4). Restricting our minds to the technological aspect of technology is precisely what creates this smokescreen in front of us as we attempt to gaze into the essence of it.
Having defined the ‘correct’ definition of technology, it is now time to examine it and see why it is not ‘true’. Before proceeding, one might ask: What is the significance of instrumentality? Well, “[i]nstrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire, step by step, into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing” (Heidegger, 12). When attempting to learn what technology is, one cannot disregard its instrumentality; instead, we are to avoid reducing it as such. Again, “[t]echnology is therefore no mere [emphasis added] means” (Heidegger, 12). When we look beyond its instrumentality, “another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (Heidegger, 12). This “realm of revealing” cannot be entered into when utilizing technology as a “mere means” (Heidegger, 12). Although the instrumental definition is correct, it is not synonymous with the truth of technology’s essence.
The term “technology” finds its origins in the Greek language; “Technikon means that which belongs to technē (Heidegger, 12). It does not refer “only [to] the activities and skills of craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs to bringing-forth, to poiēsis; it is something poietic” (Heidegger, 13). Heidegger demonstrates that even at the essence of the word, technology is not a “mere means.” Some rebut this by saying that “modern technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science” (Heidegger, 14). As such, the Greek rendering of the word does not fit in contemporary discourse on technology (see Heidegger, 13). Heidegger acknowledges that there is a difference between them, but he stands firm in asserting that modern technology, like traditional technology, ”is a revealing” (Heidegger, 14). He utilizes an illustration of “a tract of land [which] is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain” (Heidegger, 14–15). This is a notable difference compared to the “old windmill [. . .] [whose sails] are left entirely to the wind’s blowing” (Heidegger, 14). Although the two kinds of technology differ in their relationship to nature, both challenge it and bring forth that which is to be revealed; both forms of technology are indeed “a revealing” (Heidegger, 14).
Heidegger notes that “[w]here and how does this revealing happen if it is no mere handiwork [emphasis added] of man? We need not look far” (Heidegger, 18). Stripping down the constructs that we have established and examining technology in an “unbiased” manner will be essential in revealing. Revealing does not stem from solely “human [acts]. Therefore we must take that challenging that sets upon man to order the real as standing-reserve in accordance with the way in which it shows itself. That challenging gathers man into ordering” (Heidegger, 19). The challenge claim that gets man to this point is called “[e]nframing” (Heidegger, 19). Heidegger defines it as “that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological” (Heidegger, 20). It is in the question of how one gets to the essence of technology, where it then becomes apparent that the mere instrumentality of technology cannot lead to it; as Heidegger noted, “the essence of modern technology [. . .] is [. . .] nothing technological” (Heidegger, 19). What is evident here? It’s that despite the correctness of technology’s instrumentality, it is a far cry from the essence of technology; in other words, the truth of technology cannot be understood apart from technology’s instrumentality but simultaneously cannot be identified as a mere means. Heidegger is challenging us to not view the ‘correct’ as synonymous with the ‘true.’
The mere fact that we are inquiring into technology’s essence itself “bear[s] witness to the crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with technology we do not yet experience the coming to presence of technology, that in our sheer aesthetic mindedness we no longer guard and preserve the coming to presence of art. Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art becomes” (Heidegger, 35). If the ‘correct’ definition of technology sufficed, there would be no need to inquire in the first place! Evidently, “the merely correct is not yet the true” (Heidegger, 6).
Reference List
Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977)